are increasingly organised around the concept of 'organisational risk ' (Power 2004) . 1 While it is well-recognised that 'risk management' has become 'a key organizing principle of contemporary correctional practice and offender management ' (Maurutto and Hannah-Moffat, 2006: 438), there is less scrutiny of how the prison sector is responding to demands -from both internal and external sources -that it assess and manage 'organisational risk' (such as financial or legal risk) ( In order to explore these issues, we have divided the article into three parts. The first part speculates on British criminology's (non) engagement with human rights and queries why the growth in prisoner rights litigation has not registered in criminology scholarship on prisons.
everywhere that risk appears, it is assembled into complex configurations with other technologies… '(2004: 26-7) . This article responds to that appeal by focusing specifically on prison governance in the UK. It aims, first, to draw attention to a range of intersections between risk and human rights, and argues that these intersections require analysis. Secondly, it suggests some key features of a 'risk and rights' analysis by drawing upon insights from within criminology, human rights law and regulation scholarship.
UK prison governance provides the catalyst for our argument because, in recent years, analyses of penal policy and prison law have been very heavily influenced by discourses of risk and human rights (Sparks 2000a , Kemshall 2003 Livingstone et al. 2003) . For the most part, however, risk discourses have been used only by criminologists and not by lawyers: equally, although human rights has featured prominently in the work of lawyers, it is rarely discussed in criminology. This divide -amongst scholars who share a common interest in prison governance -provides one of our starting points. The other starting point is a concern about the role of human rights law in an era in which public sector regulation and service delivery in the UK 3
The simplest explanation for the lack of engagement by British criminologists with the relationship between risk and rights would run as follows: only a handful of criminologists ever mention human rights. As McEvoy (2003: 39) points out, the significance of human rights 'appears to have made little genuine inroads into [the] conceptual or practical frameworks' of criminology (see also Cohen 1998; Jamieson 1999 ). This neglect of rights is surprising given British criminology's close engagement with state power: if '[f] or most of its existence, criminology has been located, for all practical purpose, within the institutions of the criminal justice state' (Garland and Sparks 2000: 201) , it seems strange that the growth of prisoners' rights would be overlooked by criminologists. Yet, apart from McEvoy's work (2001) examining the role of law in the context of paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland, and Liebling's discussion of human rights norms in the creation of a 'moral performance' framework for the assessment of prison environments (2004: 452-3) , criminological scholarship on UK prisons and prisoners generally does not seem interested in engaging with rights.
3 How, then, might this continuing absence be explained?
It could be that criminologists (like lawyers (McCrudden 2006) ) adhere strongly to disciplinary boundaries. Moreover, criminologists may be all the more conscious of these demarcations as a result of the ongoing debates over the fragmented nature and status of their discipline (e.g., Cohen 1998; Braithwaite 2000; Walklate 2001; Garland 2002; Zedner 2003) , including for example contemporary appeals 'to reconnect criminology to sociology' (Mythen and Walklate 2006: 380; Young 2003) . 4 Many commentators have suggested that the disciplinary closure of British criminology can be traced to its historical bias towards administrative and empirical work and its closeness to established centres of power. So, for example, Brown and Pratt have claimed that: 'Born as it was to meet the needs of governance, criminology reaffirms itself not by internal reflection but rather by reference to the material demands of penal administration ' (2000: 3; Loader 1998 ). This claim points us towards another 3 See also the references to human rights in work by Cohen (2001) , Coyle (2002) , Piacentini (2004) , , and Scraton and Moore (2005) . 4 Interestingly, Turner (2006) (Livingstone et al. 2003) , the contemporary position appears much the same . Indeed, two factors suggest that the influence of research funders may be even more significant today in foreclosing human rights questions: first, 'the vast amount of funding has been directed to positivist/administrative projects that seek answers to crime causation or aim to improve existing apparatuses of crime control' (Walters 2003a: 20-1; 2003b; Carlen 2002 Perhaps (part of) the answer to the omission lies elsewhere -specifically, in the relationship between criminology and law. Freeman has pointed out that, historically, human rights -not just human rights law -was foreign territory for non-lawyers:
'Before the 1970s almost all academic work done on human rights was done by lawyers, and most articles were published in law journals ' (2002: 78) . This blanketing of human rights by lawyers could well have been particularly off-putting for criminologists, especially in light of historic tensions between criminal law and criminology concerning both the institutional origins of criminology, and the perceived negative influence of law and lawyers on criminology's intellectual and political agendas (Finnane 2006: 399-400 The paradox here is that discussion of human rights only started to feature prominently in mainstream legal literature in the UK in the 1990s, following indications from the Labour Party that, if elected, it would enact a charter of rights.
Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998, civil liberties, ECHR jurisprudence and international human rights law were subjects of specialist, not general, interest within both law schools and legal practice (Whitty et al. 2001: 1-18 Yet, even if we tally all of these various explanations for the current foci of British criminology, 7 it is still surprising that human rights analysis remains so absent. To put it bluntly, the general shift towards rights-based constitutionalism in the United Kingdom, and the specific impact of human rights law on both prisoner rightsconsciousness and prison governance, needs to be recognised in prison-focused criminology.
Part Two: (Human Rights) Lawyers and Risk
The non-engagement of criminologists with human rights provides one explanation for the absence of a scholarship on the relationship between risk and rights. But, as noted at the outset, there is a second explanation that needs also to be considered:
namely, lawyers in the UK haven't been greatly interested in the concept of risk, nor have they made much reference to the extensive risk literature (Steele 2004; Giddens 1999) . 8 We suspect that, for non-lawyers, these omissions will seem surprising given that law is often about using expert knowledges and managing risk: consider, for example, the use of 'risk of harm' tests in the child protection and mental health contexts, and the use of 'risk of re-offending' criteria in sentencing, parole and civil preventative order contexts. Yet, even in the areas of environmental protection and consumer health and safety law, where the 'precautionary principle' has an established presence in both national and European regulatory approaches, UK legal scholars have done remarkably little work on risk (Feintuck 2005; Chalmers 2005 ).
Most notably, in those areas of human rights law, such as the absolute prohibition on torture, where explicit dichotomies have been drawn between concepts of rights and risk, analysis also remains scant (Zedner 2005) . 9 As we discuss further below, it is only in the field of regulation studies that lawyers have been involved in generating detailed critical accounts of risk assessment and management, both in public and 7 It is of course also important to break down general claims about 'British' criminology in light of the legal and political histories of the different jurisdictions within the UK, including the different histories of human rights activism (see McEvoy and Ellison (2003) in relation to Northern Ireland).
8 But see O'Malley (2004) for an historical account of the role of risk, and the related concept of uncertainty, in the development of contract, tort and insurance law. 9 Health law scholarship provides an exception to the general trend: see, e.g., mental health (Gray et al. private sector organisations (e.g., Fisher 2000; Hood et al 2004) . To begin with, though, we consider if there are any general characteristics of the risk literature that could help to explain the typical stance of British lawyers towards risk.
One feature of the scholarship on risk that might be off-putting to lawyers is the range and complexity of risk theorising and the tendency to not differentiate sharply between perspectives. As Garland has argued, 'the risk literature' is in fact 'several distinct literatures, involving different projects, different forms of inquiry, and different conceptions of their subject matter, all linked tenuously together by a tantalizing four-letter word ' (2003: 49) . This may present a particular challenge for
British lawyers: the long-standing pragmatic ethos and practitioner focus of British lawyers (Twining 1994; Cownie 2004 ) is arguably ill-suited to a risk literature wherein 'myriad versions of social theory [are] operating under the conceptual umbrella of risk' (Chan and Rigakos 2002: 744) . Indeed we suspect that a survey of the law school curriculum would find practically no reference to the three main critical groupings in the risk literature -namely, the 'risk society' perspective associated with Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992 Beck ( , 2002 ; the 'governmentality' perspective which draws upon Foucault's writings and views risk as a complex disciplinary tool, operating through both coercion and voluntary compliance (e.g., Rose 1999); and the socio-cultural perspective on risk associated with Douglas (1992) and Sparks (2000a; 2000b; , which insists that culture is a crucial factor in any social group's perceptions of risk and its politicisation.
A second factor explaining lawyers' non-engagement with the risk literature is that practices of 'risk assessment' are generally represented as requiring expert scientific processes of judgement. This representation can be traced to the techno-scientific focus of the fourth main grouping in the risk literature. That grouping tends to be clustered in disciplines such as medicine, economics and engineering: its hallmark is that it treats risk as a 'taken-for-granted objective phenomenon' (Lupton 1999: 2) and it aims to identify, map, predict and regulate different types of risk according to expert criteria. The key significance of this approach is that it generates a strong sense of risk as a non-legal knowledge which, in terms of legal practice, has important consequences. To put it crudely, although it is routine for practising lawyers and judges to work with expert evidence, the representation of risk as a scientific measurement means that, amongst academic lawyers, the critique of risk may be seen as belonging more properly to other disciplines -such as economics, chemistry or psychiatry. Thus, evidence law scholars, for example, may scrutinise the assembly and uses of expert evidence, especially its reliability in terms of the evidentiary rules of proof, but they very rarely raise questions concerning the contingency and uncertainty of scientific knowledge (Jasanoff 1995) . This phenomenon, furthermore, is compounded by the fact that the professional status of lawyers, and the adversarial nature of litigation, has historically resulted in mutually-reinforcing associations with certain expert professions (most obviously, medicine).
A third factor which may explain the pattern of legal scholarship on risk is that the ' (2006: 425) . In the final part of the article below, we draw from scholarship within criminology and law to argue that the combined operation of risk and rights discourses may however be more complex and unpredictable than these commentaries appear to suggest. In particular, we take issue with the apparent dichotomy between risk and rights knowledges.
Part Three: The Co-Existence of Risks and Rights in Prison Governance
Our general argument so far has been that risk and human rights have become dominant discourses in the UK and are likely to remain so. We find these observations especially useful. Positioning risk and human rights as 'closely intersecting', Sparks notes obvious parallels between the language of rights and constructions of risk in penal policy and practice: both are sites of 'struggles for influence, credibility and recognition'. This resonates with findings within regulation scholarship that emphasise the ways in which risk management can be a cover for disputes over institutional legitimacy and competence (Black 2005; Hood et al. 2004 ).
More generally, the explicit linkage of risk with questions of rights, justice and legitimacy also provides a useful reminder of the need for criminology to 'embark on the reconnection of penological research with normative moral and political reflection' (Sparks 2001: 172) .
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In what follows, we aim to build on these observations. We argue for increased recognition of different forms of risk and rights knowledges, and of the fact that these operate in different institutional and cultural settings, and can become combined or co-exist in unexpected ways. We identify four overlapping themes, drawn from a range of literature on risk and on rights, which we see as particularly pertinent for future research in this area. These are: the social construction of risk; the diversity of legal cultures; the nature of legal knowledges; and the 'framing' of risk and rights compliance.
The social construction of risk
As outlined earlier, many accounts of risk suggest that risk assessment and management do not involve socio-political choices. This representation is reinforced in legal literature when there is an uncritical acceptance of law's historical and mutually-reinforcing associations with certain other expert practices and knowledges (such as medicine and psychiatry). In order to challenge this mindset in the prison governance context, greater attention needs to be paid to those risk analyses that do recognise the variability of risk technologies and knowledges (for example, in relation to gender (Chan and Rigakos 2002; Hannah-Moffat 2004 (2000: 515) . Accounts of risk which privilege expert knowledges and quantifiable formats may mislead not only as to the character of the information used, they may also be misleading in relation to the methods of risk assessment: for example, 'risk calculations and predictions are in fact often carried out by non-scientific personnel using very subjective tools ' (2000: 521) .
The diversity of legal cultures
Secondly, future research on risk and rights needs to pay particular attention to the diversity of legal cultures (Nelken 2004 ). This could begin by looking, on the one hand, at differences in rights cultures and, on the other, at differences in risk regulation regimes: thereafter it should be easier to build accounts of intersections between risk and rights. Differences in rights cultures emerge in part because of the distinctiveness of legal-professional cultures and also because human rights adjudication operates at intersecting levels (devolved, UK and European). This means that rights norms can be interpreted and articulated within, and across, distinct legal and political orders in ways that may lead to very different outcomes ( The diversity found in legal cultures of rights seems to have a counterpart in risk regulation. So, for example, research on the approaches of US and European agencies to risk management has highlighted substantial differences in regulatory style:
Operating in a fishbowl of transparency, with significantly less protection from civil service traditions or legal insulation than their European counterparts, American regulators were not free to justify their actions by simply invoking delegated authority or superior expertise; they had to establish through explicit, principled argument that their actions fell within a zone of demonstrable rationality. Numerical assessments of risks, costs, and benefits provided compelling evidence. European regulators, by contrast, seemed generally better able to support their decisions in qualitative, even subjective terms. Expert judgment carried weight in and of itself as a basis for action, the more so when backed by negotiations among relevant parties; there was on the whole less need to refer to an exogenous method, model, or logic to support policy decisions. (Jasanoff 2005: 18) In order to investigate the validity of these claims in the prisons context, it would be necessary first to identify the nature of governance relationships and, second, the extent to which organisational risk awareness, management and compliance actually exist in practice. These are likely to be complex tasks. 
The nature of legal knowledges
This brings us to our third theme. The dominance of a static model of law means that the 'dynamics of knowledge production and circulation' (Valverde et al. 2005: 87) amongst legal networks and actors can be neglected. To remedy this, questions need Multi-agency public protection panels in England and Wales provide a good example of the hybrid quality of risk assessment and management knowledges, and the variability in actual organisational forms and practices (Kemshall and Maguire 2001) .
These panels (bringing together police, probation, prison, social services and other agencies) are designed to provide a forum for the exchange of confidential information about sexual and violent offenders, and a process for the classification, implementation and monitoring of individual 'risk management plans.' The key point for present purposes is that their construction of risk does not depend on a single distinct knowledge base: typically it will combine a mixture of actuarial, clinical, professional and common sense views, while giving a low priority to considerations of offenders' rights:
The character of the risk assessment debates … was often anything but 'scientific' or 'technology-driven'. On the contrary, researchers noted that many discussions were unstructured, even rambling, and that close attention was paid to the views and 'instincts' of members who knew the offender in question, even if unsupported by hard evidence. It was not unusual for panels to revise instrument-derived risk classifications, in essence backing their ability -through a combination of 'gut feelings' and professional experienceto make a better prediction than one based purely upon actuarial risk. 13 (ibid:
248)
Similar conclusions have been drawn about the use of risk knowledges in courts. So, for example, Valverde et al. (2005: 87) have argued that, although 'literature on risk and law tends to counterpoise expert knowledge to law and legal reasoning', it is more 'useful to not assume that everything that goes in as 'expert witness testimony' is epistemologically homogenous ("science" or "expertise")'. They argue that the focus should be on the different types of knowledges that operate within both legal and pre-legal processes, and how and why such knowledges come to be categorised as legal/non-legal, expert/everyday, or some other hybrid form. In their case study on the ways in which courts in New Jersey have 'translated' expert assessments of risk of reoffending under Megan's Law -a community notification statute authorising public access to information about the identity of convicted sex offenders who are considered to present a risk of re-offending -they identify the ways in which knowledges migrate between legally-trained personnel and extra-legal professionals. (Scott 2000; Black 2004 ).
Additionally, private organisations such as firms and NGOs have an increasing role in public sector governance, both in the creation and the implementation of policy (for example, private security firm provision) (Scott 2002) .
Another complicating factor is the lack of research addressing the relationship between risk-based and rights-based regulatory demands on -to use the terminology of the Human Rights Act 1998 -'public authorities' in the UK. Regulation scholarship, which has examined risk management in the public and private sectors,
has not yet engaged with the growth of rights awareness or litigation. And socio-legal scholarship, which has started to examine human rights compliance practices, has not addressed issues of risk-based governance. What is needed are accounts of whether, and how, 'legal risk' is being framed at the different levels of the prison sector in light of both legal (rights compliance) and non-legal (organisational risk compliance) demands.
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In developing these accounts, the scholarship produced by public lawyers who have looked at the social and legal effects of risk-based regulation and, in particular, at how risk discourses operate within particular organisational cultures will be of central relevance (Fisher 2003; Black 2005; Feintuck 2005 ). Its importance lies in explaining how different types of organisational risk (such as financial or legal risk) are generated and must be 'managed' according to various regulatory models and goals.
While there is still very limited research on how organisations actually respond to governance by legal and non-legal rules, and the relationship between these sets of rules (Parker et al. 2004; Baldwin 2004) , it is obvious that the prison sector has to respond to the twin requirements of organisational risk management and compliance with rights norms (Fisher 2003; Foster 2005; Murphy and Whitty 2007) .
Empirical studies of the prison sector are required to develop an account of framing.
Here we make two preliminary observations. First, risk and/or rights issues will be 'framed' differently in different contexts, and political culture influences both normative and scientific discourses (Jasanoff 2005) . For example, accounts of regulatory governance demonstrate that 'organisations adopt structures and follow procedures not just, or not even, to achieve goals, but to gain legitimacy in the widest sense' (Black 2005: 19) . And this emphasis on legitimacy has important political effects:
The rhetoric of 'risk management' and 'risk-based' approaches combines a sense of strategy and control in a way which is politically compelling; moreover, framing one's actions as 'risk-based' is, in the current climate, a useful legitimating device. But the framing of the regulatory task in terms of risk has the potential to have more than a rhetorical effect: it imports particular conceptions of the problem at hand, and leads to the framing of a solution in a particular way. (ibid)
Secondly, 'risk colonization' -whereby 'risk increasingly comes to define the object, methods, and rationale of regulation' (Rothstein et al. 2006: 93) -has implications for attitudes towards compliance. For example, organisational cultures may turn towards 'defensive compliance' -'actors think, act, and communicate within the four-square corners of risk classification schemes and internal procedures, and they avoid making hard decisions and expressing opinions that are more honest' (Ericson 2006: 352) or viewed as 'political' (Feintuck 2005: 388; Fisher 2003 there is an accepted devaluing of the rights of some groups, such as (suspect) sexual offenders:
The notion of offenders' rights took low priority in the thinking of [public protection] panel members; concern was rarely expressed about possible violations of rights to privacy, or of the fundamental distinction between those who are under statutory supervision or control (e.g. on probation or conditional release licence) and those who are not (including those merely suspected of offending). Similarly, although police officers recognized that they had no right to enter the homes even of registered sex offenders, they often deliberately gave them the impression that they did have such rights. 
Conclusion
Our main purpose in this article has been to draw attention to cleavages in scholarship on risk and on rights. UK prison governance has become enveloped by discourses of risk and of rights: what is little understood, however, is how these discourses are interacting. In suggesting that there is a need for an analysis of how these discourses co-exist, we have advocated that both criminologists and lawyers engage more fully with scholarship which recognises the social construction of both risks and rights, investigates public sector regulatory models, and pays closer attention to the apparent mobility and hybrid quality of legal knowledges. We have also argued for greater interdisciplinarity in order to be able more accurately to describe the current prison Zinger 2004 ) also remain to be explored, especially when considered in the context of combined risk and rights discourses.
